T H E increasing use of social research in American society and its increasing rele vance to public policy and social decisions have engendered widespread concerns about the ethical implications of such research activities. Briefly, these concerns are of two kinds: (a) con, cerns relating to the processes of social research, which are exemplified best by the issue of invasion of privacy and its various ramifications; and (b) concerns relating to the products of social research, which focus largely on the fear that social research may provide tools for controlling and manipulating human behavior and, more specifically, that these tools may be used by some segments of the society at the expense of others.
the ethical concerns about social research that are being voiced increasingly-both within and outside of the social science community-reflect the fear that the very process of social research itself or the knowledge it produces may bring about limita tions of individual freedom. Thus, the concern about invasion of privacy dwells on the prospect that the individual's freedom of choice about the extent and nature of his participation in social re search-and thus about what may be a significant segment of his personal life-may be restricted. The concern about Control of human behavior dwells on the prospect that knowledge produced by social research may be used to reduce the indi vidual's freedom to act in terms of his own values and interests.
The ethical problems surrounding social research, with their direct implications for human freedom, can be conceptualized in terms of the power rela tionship between the subjects of social research, on the one hand, and the social scientist, as well as the sponsor and user of social research, on the other hand. Ethical problems arise because of the fact that-and to the extent thaI-the individuals, groups, and communities that provide the data for social research are deficient in power relative to the other participants in the research process. I shall touch occasionally on the power relationships among these other participants themselves-such as that between the researcher and the research sponsor-which raise significant issues in their own right (often with implications for the research subject). The primary focus of the present analy sis, however, shall be on the relative power position of the research subject.
THI': POWER DEFICIENcy OF THE SUBJECT IN 
SOCIAL RESEARCH
The power deficiency that often characterizes the subject in social research can he traced to two AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST· Noveeram (972 • 989 sources: (u) his posruon of relative disadvantage within the social system-that is, the society in general and the particular organization in which the research is conducted; and (h) his position of relative disadvantage within tbe research situation proper. In other words, subjects for social researcb tend to be recruited from the relatively powerless segments of the society or organization and thus come into tbe research situation at a disadvantage. This disadvantage is further exacerbated by their limited power within the structure of the research situation itself.
The Suhject's Position witlli" the Social System
A great deal of social research is carried out on groups that are in some sense disadvantaged within the society; children and old people, ethnic minori ties and welfare recipients, mental patients and in valids, criminals and delinquents, drug addicts and alcoholics, college sophomores and military recruits. These groups are dependent and powerless by vir., rue of their age, their physical and mental condi tion, their economic and political position, their educational level, their social deviance, or their captive status within various institutions.
Various reasons can be cited for the tendency to focus so much social research on disadvantaged groups. To a large extent, this tendency is a re, flection of what is taken as problematic within the society and within its research community (cf. Kelman, 1970b, pp. 82-84) . Two strands of prob lem definition seem to he converging on the dis advantaged groups. On the one hand, the estab lished segments of society are concerned with the control of social deviance and the management of social dependency. Insofar as social scientists themselves tend to come from the middle classes, they share this concern. More importantly, how ever, this concern is part of the mission of many of the agencies, both public and private, that spon sor social research, and is, therefore, reflected in the kinds of research questions to which investiga tors address themselves and hence the populations from whom they seek their data. On the other hand, many social scientists-and some of the agencies sponsoring social research-are rooted in a tradition of "social problems" research and strongly committed to social welfare and social re form. They are concerned with helping individuals and communities who, for one or another reason, are troubled and powerless. This concern often 990 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMEIHCAN PSYCHoLOGrST leads them to focus their research on the disadvan taged groups themselves. In short, social research -c-whether out of a concern with social control or social change or some combination of the two often has defined its problems in a way that calls [or subjects from among the disadvantaged seg ments of th society.
Another important reason for the tendency to draw disproportionately on disadvantaged groupS in the recruitment of subjects for social research is the greater availability of these groups. Practi cal considerations of availability of subjects often determine which of a number of potentially rele vant populations an investigator studies. In fact, an investigator may study a population less relevant to his problem simply because it is more available, or he even may choose his research problem in terms of considerations of availability. In general, members of disadvantaged groups are more readily available precisely because of their power de ficiency. Investigators can induce them more easily to participate in research that members of more powerful groups would find objectionable, and more securely expect them to put up wltb proce dures that higher status subjects would challenge. In most cases, they lack both the ability and the habit of "talking back." Rightly or wrongly, they perceive themselves as having no choice, particu larly since the investigators are usually higher in status and since the agencies sponsoring and con ductlng the research may represent (or at least ap pear to represent) the very groups on which the sub jeers are dependent. The link between dependence and availability is, of course, very direct in those situations in which the research is conducted in the context of an institution where the subject is held "captive" or is in a clearly defined position of lower status. The institutionalized child, the bos pitalized patient, the prison or reformatory inmate, the army recruit, and the grade school pupil are almost automatically available as subjects for re search conducted or approved by institutional authorities. Similarly, though the university is not a "total institution" in the same sense as a mental hospital or a prison (cf. Coffman, 1961) , psycho logical and social research has relied so heavily on college sophomores for its subjects because of their relative availability in that organizational context
The last examples call auenfion to the fact that the subject's power deficiency often is based not only on his position in the society at large, but also ' -. -, on his pennon within the particnlar organization in which the research is conducted. Typically, research in organizational contexts is sponsored by those in high-status positions who "own" the or ganizalion, while the data are obtained from tbose in low-status positions. For example, social re search in industry usually is sponsored by top management, but the data are provided by blue collar workers and now more frequently by middle level management. Insofar as the research is re lated to the way in which the organization is run-to questions of personnel policies, for in stance-it has direct consequences for members in lower status positions. Yet the researeh usually is focused on those issues that top management eon siders problematic. The less powerful segments of the organization generally lack the familiarity with social research as a potentially useful tool for their own purposes, the financial and manpower resources to carry out such research, and the ability to elicit the ready cooperation of the organiznticn's higher echelons.
The nneven distribution of resources also plays a major role in the selection of societies and com munities as subjects for social research. At this level too we find a considerable discrepancy in power between those who conduct social research and those who serve as its subjects. Social scien tists from the more affluent and powerful indus trialized nations often go to developing countries to carry out their research; very rarely, however, do African, Asian, or Latin Amcrican social scien tists come to study conditions in the more indus trialized parts of the world. Similarly, within the United States, social research often has been car ried out by members of the white middle class, collecting their data in black, Puerto Rican, Indian, or poor white communities: very rarely has the pattern been reversed. Thus, within the context , of the international system or the national system, we see again that the subjects for social research tend to be drawn from the communities in dis advantaged and relatively powerless positions. The more powerful communities are generally l~e only ones who have the resources to carry out social research and who are thus in a position to define what is problematic. At the same time, they are better able to resist intrusions from the outside and thus to avoid being studied themselves.
In sum, the subjects in social research tend to be drawn disproportionately from the disadvantaged segments in the society, from the lower status positions in the organizations in which the re search is carried out, and from the less affluent and powerful communities in the national and international systems.
Tbeir power deficiency within the social system places them at a dis. advantage vis-a-vis the more powerful agencies that sponsor and conduct the research. It in creases their vulnerability with respect both to their recruitment as subjects and lo their treatment in the research situation. That is, they bave (or at least feel that they have) less freedom to refuse participation in the researeh and less leverage to protect themselves against procedures that they may find objectionable. Furthermore, tbe sub jects' power deficiency reduces the likelihood that the products of the research will accrue to their benefit. Their own groups typically have no voice in determining the questions to which the research is to be addressed, in terms of their definition of whal is problematic, nor do they have the resources to make nse of Ihe research findings. Thus, the subjects lack the power to counteract the possi bility that the research in which they participate may be irrelevant or even antagonistic to their own interests.
The Subject's Position witltilJ lite Research Silua!jo/l
Regardless of his position in society, the sub ject's position within the research situation itself generally places him at a disadvantage. Tbe in vestigator usually defines and takes charge of the situation on his own terms and in line with bis own values and norms, and the subject has only limited opportunity to question the procedures. This is particularly true when the research is carried out in a selling "owned" by the investigator {such as a research laboratory) and utilizes struc tured techniques (such as experimental tasks, ques tionnaires, interviews, or psychological tests). Once a person agrees to come lo the laboratory or to carry out a research procedure, he subjects him self to the control of the investigator-as the very use of the term "subject" implies. When the re search is carried out in a selling owned by the subject and takes the form of observing the natural flow of ongoing behavior (as in studies or organi zations or communities utilizing participant ob servation), the investigator's control is far less extensive. He is not in a position to structure the AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST' NOVDlBER 1972 • 991 behavior of his subjects and he is expected to ad here Lo the norms of the selling. Yet, even in this type of research, once members of an organization or community open their doors to an investigator, they relinquish a cousiderable degree of their con trol to him, since they usually have only limited knowledge of what is being observed and to what use these observations will be put. Of course, if observations are carried out without the subjects' knowledge, then their conlrol 01 the situation is reduced even further.
The power deficiency of the subject within the research situation derives from the structure of that situation itself, rather tban from the subject's posi tion in the society or organization. The situation linked disadvantage of the subject, however, is especially pronounced if his societal or organiza tional status is relatively low. Low-status and de pendent subjects do not have-c-or at least do not avail themselves of-the full degree of counter vailing power with which the research situation provides the subject. Potentially, the subject's power in his relationship with the investigator is not inconsiderable, since the investigator's ability to carry out his research ultimately depeuds on the subject's cooperation. Althougb tbe subject relinquishes control over the situation ouce he agrees to participate, he must first be induced to enter into the agreement; and, furthermore, if he finds the situation sufficiently distasteful, be may withdraw from the agreement despite the embar rassment that such a step would entail. But sub jccts who occupy low-status or dependent positions in the society or organization are less likely to see themselves as having the option to refuse participa tion in the research, or to withdraw once they have entered the situation." Compared to higher status J Th~re are 50mc Interesting exceptions to this gencr:l.liza_ tion. Survey researchers often have noted that the r::lte of refusal encountered by . interviewers ringing rloorbehs t~nlls to be relatively higher among poor rcspoudcnts, Thi5 tendency is probably due to the [act that the poor (and particularly the uneducated) respondent (0) i~ less likely to have a cognitive framcwork to which he can reb.le the requC.'iL for an interview, (b) is more likely to feel lhal he has no opinions on the topic of the inLerview, and (e) is more likely to be suspicious o[ ;l middl~-cIJ5S slranger with p;ld and pencil in hand, who is remini~ctnL or a welfare investigator or other such official. For all of these reasons, when given the option, the poor rt~DDudenL m:ty prefer not 10 hercme involVed. \Vhen research is cirrled out in an institl.ltion~1 ccntext, however, he is likely to feel that he has no option and that his parricipa 992 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMERICAN PS\,CHOLOGIST subjects, they are more reluctant to question or challenge the investigator, and-even if they were inclined to raise questions-they usually have less of the knowledge required to raise them effectively. They still have some power in the situation-the power to undermine the research by providing false information, performing the required task im properly, or engaging in some other form of subtle sabotage. Such efforts at undermining research have become a very real possibility, lor example, in laboratory experiments in psychology carried out on college campuses, often with a more or less captive subject population. Typically, however, subjects will not engage in deliberate acts of sabo ngc, as long as they accept the legitimacy of the investigator and the research situation.
Two closely interrelated factors limit the sub ject's exercise of power in the research situation; he perceives himself as lacking both the capacity and the rigid to question the research procedures. Although the strength of these factors is likely to vary, as we have already seen, as a function of the subject's position in the society or organization, basically they are built into the structure of the research situation. The subject feels tbat he lacks the capacity to question research procedures be cause he does not have the necessary informational base for doing so. It is usually presumed, partic ularly if the research is carried out iu an institu tional setting (such as a university or a hospital), that the investigator has the credentials required for running the study. I{ he did not, then pre sumably he would not be there. Thus, the subject usually takes it for gran led that the investigator knows what he is doing and that he is proceeding i.
from information that tbe subject himself could not possibly have. Not only does the investigator have expertise and specialized knowledge in the field which the subject usually does not possess, but he is also operating in a situation that is con structed entirely by him and defined in his owu terms. The investigator is the only one who knows the dimensions of the situatiou, who knows the nature of the business to be transacted and tbe way in which it is to be trausacted. Under the cir, cumstauces, the subject feels that he Jacks the information thaL would enable bim to question the Lion is one of the obligations 01 hi1 dependent rote-sunless, of course, resistance is mobilized through an organized error! investigator's actions, to challenge him, or to dis agree with bim.
The investigator's specialized knowledge and ex pertise are a major component of his perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the subject. That is, his expertness contributes to the subject's view that the investigator has the right to set rules and prescribe behavior in this situation, and that the subject, in turn-having submitted himself to the investigator's aUlhority-does not have the right 10 question these procedures. Clearly, there are limits to what a subject will do without question, and these limits are reached more quickly in some situations than in others and by some subjects than by others. There is considerable evidence, how ever, that at least iu certain laboratory situations, many subjects will engage in behaviors that are highly distasteful and poteutially harmful to them selves or to others when snch behaviors are required by the experimenter (e.g. Milgram, 1963; Orne & Evans, 1965) . At the very least it can be said that, insofar as subjects accept the investigator's legitimacy, they arc reluctant to claim the right to question his procedures.
The investigator's presumed expertness is one of a number of features of the research situation that jointly enhance his legitimacy in the eyes of the subjects and hence his relative power over them. There are usually indications that the investigator's role is socially recognized and supported. He often carries out the research in the name of or under the sponsorship of an official agency or prestigious institution. When the research actually is carried out in the setting of a university or a hospital Or a government facility, then the institutional aura of legitimacy spreads to the research situation. The investigator may also he covered and surrounded by some of the trappings of legitimacy-such as the white coat, the sign un the door, the diploma on the wall, or the expensive equipment. Further more, legitimacy that inheres in other institutional roles often is transferred to the research situation; for example, when research on students is carried out or sponsored by a professor, research on pa tients by a physician, or research on citizens by a government agency, the investigator's legitimacy in the research situation is enhanced by his rela tionship to the subject outside of the research situ ation. Finally, a major contributor to the investi gator's perceived legitimacy is the acceptance of science as a general value within the society. The subject feels obliged to cooperate with and reluc tant to question procedures that are presented to him in the name of science. In the context of a scientific study, he does not feel entitled to chal lenge the investigator merely because he finds a procedure personally uncomfortable or distasteful.
It is interesting to note that, in some sense, the value society places on science gives the scientific investigator even greater power over his subject than the physician has over his patient in the usual medical relationship. The physician has a great deal of power because he possesses specialized kuowledge and expertise that the patient does uot have, particularly since this knowledge relates to questions of life and death for the patient: because he is higher in social status than the average pa tient; and because he is supported fully by the trappings of legitimacy. Yet, the fact remains that the physician's task is to serve tbe patient and to meet his interests. Ultimately, the patient is ex pected to follow his instructions because it is in his owu interest to do so. The instructions of the scientist, cu the other hand, are not even subject to that restriction, since tbey are legitimized by a social value that supposedly transcends the inter ests of the individual subject. Thus, the subject does not have the "rigbt"-as does the patient-to bring his own interests into consideration. Clearly, the position of greatest power vis-a-vis the subject is held by the medical researcher, since be can draw both on the physician's link to matters of life and death and on the scientist's link to overarching values. Tbe social and behavioral scientist does not have quite as great a power advantage Over his subject, but he too operates in a research situation whose structure and governing values make it diffi· cult [or the subject to question its procedures.
Counteracting the SUbjcct's Power Dfficicncy
The basic thesis of this article is that most ethi cal problems arising in social research can be traced to the subject's power deficiency, as described in the last two sections, and that therefore a major way of dealing with these ethical problems is to seck mechanisms for overcoming or counteracting this deficiency. Before presenting in more specific detail some of the ethical problems that arise in social research and some uf the corrective ap proaches one might use, let me indicate in general terms what (arms such approaches would bave to take.
The most obvious way of counteracting the sub ject's power deficiency is to develop mechanisms for increasing his power over the research-his power over the questions to which the research is to address itself, over the selection of participants, over the procedures to be employed, and over the uses to which the findings will be put. Insofar as the subject's power deficiency is based on his posi tion in society, his power could be enhanced by extending the range of participation in social reo search within the soetety-c-by seeing to iL that all segments of the society have equal opportunity to carry out research and equal likelihood of heing called on to serve as subjects. Such a state 01 affairs would, of course, not assure that the subjects iu any given study are as powerful in terms 01 their social position as the investigator, but it would re duce the systematic imbalance of the current situ ation in which investigators as a group are more powerful than subjects as a group. Insofar as the subject's power deficiency is based on his position within the research situation, his power could be enhanced by exploring models of research that would allow the subject more equal participation in the whole research process. Such models pre suppose active efforts to share information with the subjects so that they would have the capacity to participate in meaningful ways.
Althnugh these ways of empowering the subject require major revisions in the structure and meth odology of social research, it is both possible and, in Illy view, highly desirable to consider such re visions. I suggest in later sections some mech aniSllls for moving in these directions. Even at best, however, I do not think it possible to elimi nate entirely all discrepancies in power beLween subject and investigator.
As far as discrepancies based on position within the society are concerned, there are some groups that often provide subjects but that cannot, by their very nature, provide investigators. Children are the hest example of such a group; other ex amples might be mental patients, criminals, or illiterates. When members of these groups serve as subjects, tbcy are involved of necessity in an unequal relationship, since there is no real possi bility of role reversal. The only alternative would be to rclrain from using these groups as research subjects, but such a solution would entail an ex cessively high social cost. It would rule out re search that might be of great value to socieLY in 994 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMF;RICAN PSyCHOLOGIST general, as well 3.5. to the particular groups in question.
There are other disadvantaged groups-c-for ex ample, blacks and other ethnic minorities-that can be brought Into fuller participation in the research process. Even here, however, the power discrepan cies between the investigator and subject are re moved only partially. Certainly, the overall power deficiency 01 black ghetto residents who serve as subjects for social research would be reduced greatly if blacks were represented fully in the social science community and i{ it were as common for black social scientists to study white subjects as it has been for whites to study black subjects. Yet, blacks who are trained and employed as social scientists, although they are closer to the black ghetto by virtue of their race and sometimes by virtue of their class origin, are themselves in higher status positions within the society than the average ghetto dweller. Thus, even if all research in black ghettos were carried out by black social scientists (which I would find undesirable for reasons to be mentioned later), the power discrepancy between subject and investigator would not be eliminated. If nothing else, the level 01 education required of a social scientist places him in a position of greater advantage within the society than that held by many of his subjects. Thus, a certain degree of discrepancy in power is inherent in the very social role of the researcher.
As far as discrepancies based on position within the research situation itself are concerned, it is even more obvious that they cannot be removed totally. Although it is possible to strip the re search situation of some of its unnecessary mys tique and to provide opportunities for genuine participation on the part of the subjects, it is generally impossible to extend to the subject equal control over the situation. Because of his special ized knowledge, the investigator must have greater power than tbe subject in determining the design and methodology of the research and hence in defining rhe conditions o( the research situation. In most cases, an investigator who claims to he shanng this power equally with his subjects is either pretending (perhaps to himself as well as to his subjects) that he has relinquished power while subtly maintaining control ur sacrilicing the quality of his research .
II we assume then that the subject's power over the research cannot be increased in all cases to the level of equality with the investigator-that even at best the investigator will have in many cases a more powerful position in society than his subjects, and that in some respects he must have greater power within the research situation-what other mechanisms can serve to counteract the subject's power deficiency? I\Iy general answer to this ques tion is that we must find ways of assuring that in vestigators will use their power in legitimate rather than arbitrary fashion. Insofar as they use their power legitimately, the subject's relative power would in effect be enhanced indirectly.
The concept of legitimacy generally is applied to political systems, but it is equally applicable to auy social system, including that defined by the investi gator-subject relationship. I cannot discuss here the concept in detail, but I can list some of the central criteria that would have to be met if the use of power-in any system-is to be regarded as legiti mate: (a) Those who exercise power and those over whom it is exercised must constitute a com munity, sharing common values and norms. (h) These norms must include some rules that define the limits within which the power holder must operate-the domain of behavior over which he is entitled to exercise his control, the circumstances under which he may use his power, and the manner in which he may use it; he can be held accountable whenever he violates these rules by going beyond the permissible limits of his power. (e) The person over whom power is exercised must have recourse to mechanisms (such as courts, au ombudsman, public agencies, or ethics committees) through which he can question, challenge, or complain about the way power is being exercised over him, and he must have the assurance that these mechanisms arc not stacked against him; in short, he must have some countervailing power that enables him to pro tect and defend his own interests in the face of demands from the authorities.
These criteria are meant, for the present pur poses, to combine both normative and empirical considerations. That is, I am proposing that these are criteria that a system alight to meet in order to conform to a normative conception of legitimacy tbat I happen to share. At the same time, however, I assume that these are criteria that a system has to meet in order to be perceived as functioning legitimately by its members (at least within west ern societies, although I would hypothesize that some variant of these criteria is universally npptl cable). In other words, insofar as the authorities in a system exercise their power in accordance with these criteria, the members of the system will per ceive their demands as legitimate and in general comply with them willingly. It should be noted that, in one sense, meeting these criteria enhances the power of the authorities, since it helps tbem attain the willing cooperation of the system mem bers. To achieve this effect, however, the authori ties must accept limits on the use of their power and must contend with the countervailing power available to system members. In effect, therefore, when power in a system is exercised legitimately, tbe relative power of the system member (the "sub jeer") vis-a-vis the power holder is increased.'
The implications 01 this analysis for the relation ship between subject and investigator in social re search can be seen readily. The subject's power deficiency presents the danger that the researcher and the research sponsor may use their power over him in illegitimate fashion. Many of the ethical concerns that social research has generated in fact can be conceptualized in terms of the potentially illegitimate exercise of this power. To deal with these concerns effectively, therefore, we mnst de velop mechanisms to insure that the researcher's power will be used in legitimate fashion. Insofar as possible, it would be desirable to increase the subject's direct power over the research by pro , In speaklng o( the legitimate use of power, I am going beyond my earlier remarks about the characteristics of the lnvcstlgator ami of the ~~~\ing that enhance his legitimacy in the ryes of lhc subj~ct5 and hence his power OVe, them. llorh C3SeS invofve legitimacy in the sense thal the subject accepts lhe right I}f the inveslig:l.tar to make eert...in de mands I}f him and to set his behavior in the situation (d. Kelman, 1969) . HOWI'ver, when perception of legiti, macy i~ based (::1.5 in my urlicr di!cu.l.Sian) an the extent Lo which lhe investigator displays Lhe Ir3.pping~ of legiti_ macy and the situation invokes the ~ymboll of legitimacy, then il has the effect ()[ discouraging the subject (rom questioning ar challenging the investigator's procedures. On the oLher hand, when lhe perception of legitimacy is h""e<l nn the extent to which the investigator U5e5 hi~ power within a shared nnrrnative framework thaI sets limits an his hehavior and makes him accountable lor e~ ceedinl! these limits, then the right to question and cbnl len>:e the invc.slil;ator's procedures is built into the relation hifl. The subject accepts the Investigator's right to make demands precisely becanse this right is balanced by the subject'. right La qnc.stinn these demands. Thus, mecha nism~ designed to enhance the appearance of legilimacy should nal be confused witb mechani5ms designed La assure IhH power is exercised in legitimate fashion. AMERICAN PS\'CflOL.OCtST • NOVIo; MBEIt 19i2 • 995 viding opportunities fur his (and his group's) par ticipation in the process; since there are inherent limitations to such participation, however, it is essential to provide him with countervailing power that would enable him to protect his own interests in his relationship to the research. I shall proceed to examine within this framework, first, some of the ethical problems relating to the processes of social research, and then some of the problems relating to the products of social research.
ETlIICAl PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE PROCESSES Of Socrc. RESEARCH In speaking of the processes of social research, I refer to the experiences of the specific individuals (or groups or communities) who participate in the research as subjects-who provide the data for it. How are they recruited for the experiment, the survey, or the community study in which they par ticipate? How are they treated in the course of these procedures-that is, what kinds of experience do these represent for them? What are the con sequences of their participation for them, both in the short run and in the long run? Questions about the long-run consequences of participation, partic ularly when these involve consequences for a group nr community, overlap with the questions relating to the products of social research to which I shall address myself later. My focus at present, how ever, is not so much on the consequences of the knowledge (in the sense of a social product) that has been generated by tbe research and that may now be put to some particular social uses, as it is on the consequences of a group's having partici pated in the research, having revealed certain in formation, and having in some sense increased their own vulnerability.
Some /lluslrali;;c Problems
Some of the ethical concerns that have been voiced about one or another piece of social research have included the point that it represents an in vasion of the subject's privacy, an imposition on him, or an exploitation of him; that it deceives the subject about the true nature of the research; or that participation may be harmful to the subject because it disturbs his psychological well-being or because the data may be used somehow to his dis advantage. Let us examine some of these concerns as they apply to research carried out in different settings.
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One of the particular settings to which I have addressed myself in some detail (see, e.g., Kelman, 19.68, chap. 8 ) is that of the social-psychological laboratory. My major concern has been with the extensive use of deception in the conduct of labora tory experiments in social psychology (and in cer tain other areas of psychology as well). Deception is used because many of the phenomena that the psychologist hopes to observe would be destroyed if he revealed the true purpose of the experiment \0 his subjects. For example, if an experiment were designed to study the conditions under which an individual conforms to the judgments of the majority, knowledge of this fact would so alter the SUbject's behavior thal it would no longer be relevant to the question posed hy the experiment The medical researcher finds himself in a com parable situation when he uses placebos in drug studies: to reveal to a patient that he has been given a placebo would destroy the very reaction for which Lhe placebo is designed to control. In general, however, the situation of the medical scien tist is different from that of the behavioral scientist. When he uses deception it is often as a way of assuring readier cooperation on the subject's part. On the other hand, when the behavioral scientist uses deception, it is often integral to the natnre of his study. Withoul deception, it would be im possible-at least within tbe limits of our current research technology-to obtain the kind of in formation that many psychological experiments are designed to produce.
Thus, the experimental social psychologist is con fronted with a conflict of values. On the one hand, the usc of deception is ethically objectionable. On the other hand, however, certain lines of research cannot be pursued without the use of some deccp tion. For those who value these lines of research because they represent contributions to knowledge -perhaps even to the betterment of the human condition-it is difficult, therefore, to take the absolutist position that a psychologist must refrain from using deception in his experiments under any and all conditions. Even granting the relativist position, however, there remains the question of the extent to which deception is used, the circum stances under which it is used, and tbe way in which it is used. Before deciding to use deception, an experimenter ought to give very serious con sideration to three dimcnsions: (al the importance of the study, which refers not only to its scientific significance (admittedly a subjective judgment}, bnt also to the stage of research that it represents (e.g., exploratory versus final); (0) the availability of alternative (deception-free) methods capable of producing at least comparable information; and (c) the noxiousness of the deception, which refers both to the degree 01 deception involved and to the probability of harmful consequences." These three considerations must he put into the balance before deciding on the nse of deception. Only ii a stndy is very important and no alternative meth ods are available can anything more tban the mildest form of deception be justified. In other words, even if deception is not eliminated entirely from the reperLory ol the social psychologist, it ought to be used only in rare cases and nnder highly circnmscribed conditions. What has con cerned deeply some critics of deception, like my self, has been the fact that, by the early 19605, deception in social-psychological experiments had been routinized and escalated to such an extent that it was used as a matter of course and often took rather elaborate forms. Fortunately, the last few years have seen increasing sensitivity to this problem within the field, as part of a general re examination of the role 01 experimental methodol ogy (d. 1'1iller, 1972) .
Deception presents special problems when it is used in an experiment that is stressful, unpleasant, or potentially harmful to the subject, in the sense that it may create self-doubts, lower his self-esteem, reveal some of his weaknesses, or create temporary conflict, frustration, or anxiety. By deceiving the snbject about the nature of the experiment, the experimenter deprives him of the freedom to decide whether or not he wants to be exposed to these potentially disturbing experiences. It is, of course, true that whenever people engage in social inter action, they risk the occurrence of such experiences. This fact, however, does not in and of itself justify exposing subjects to these risks-without their ex plicit knowledge-for purposes of social research. In real-life situations, the person engages in social interactions for his own purposes and he takes whatever risks (such as an unexpected blow to his self-esteem) these interactions entail. Similar risks are taken by his partners in the interaction. By contrast, the experimental situation is one that is constructed by the experimenter [or his own pur poses and in wbich the subject participates largely for tbe benefit of the experimenter and as-a service Lo the larger social good that the research is seen to represent. Moreover, the interaction lacks reci procuy since the experimenter does not expose himself to the same kinds of risks as the subject in the interaction proper (although he does, of course, risk his scientific reputation in every experi ment he undertakes). Under tbe circumstances, it is ethically questionable Lo ask a subject to par ticipate in an experiment that migbt expose him Lo potentially disturbing experiences without in forming him of the nature of the risks entailed. Qnesrlons arise even H the risks are no greater than those involved in day-to-day social interaction; they become especially serious if the experiment is so structured that a higher than nsnal degree of stress or self-doubt is generated in the snbject.
The use of deception presents ethical problems even when the experiment does not entail potential harm or discomfort for the subject. Deception vic lates the respect to which all fellow humans are entitled and the trnst that is basic to all interper sonal relationships. Such violations arc donbly dis turbing since they contribute, in this age of mass society, to the already powerful tendencies to mann Iaeture realities and manipulate populations. Fnr thermore, by undermining the basis of trust in the relationship between investigator and subject, de ception makes it increasingly difficult for social scientists to carry out their work in the future. Subjects will be less inclined 10 cooperate in social research and, even if they do participate, to believe the invesUgator's definition of the situation and thns to react spontaneously within the terms of that definition. The effects of such "pollution" of the researeh environment are discussed in a paper by Donald Warwick (1971) .
The ethical problems often raised by social re search manifest themselves more clearly when the research is carried out in a laboratory setting since Ihe setting is almost entirely under the investi gator's control and he, therefore, enjoys (as men tioned earlier) a considerable power advantage over the subject. However, similar problems, with vary ing degrees of severity, can arise when research is '. carried out in "natural" settings-that is, when the investigator goes to the subject, rather than having the subject come to him. Warwick's paper AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST' NOVHIBER 1972 • 997 is devoted to a case study of precisely such a piece of research which combined the methods 01 participant observation and the survey inter view. To be sure, that study is atypical and raises more thorny ethical questions than most studies in its genre do, but it does illustrate that the ethical dilemmas of social research are by no means unique to a particular metbodology.
Research based on participant observation in evitably raises some concerns about the invasion of subjects' privacy. When the observation is dis guised, these concerns become particularly serious and parallel those raised by deception in the labora tory (see Erikson, 1967) . A social scientist, for example, who joins an organization in order to make observations, and misinforms or fails to in form the group about the nature of his activities, clearly is invading his subjects' privacy without giving them any choice in the matter. They may be revealing information that tbey would not have wanted to reveal to an outsider, particularly if they are deliberately keeping their activities or part of their activities secret. Insofar as the observer pre tends to be a member, he deprives the group of the opportunity to decide what to reveal or not to reveal to a nonmember.
Some ethical problems, less severe in nature, arise even if the participant observer acknowledges his research interest and is accepted in the group 011 that basis. The role of the participant observer creates many ambiguities, in that the social scien tist is seen as neither a full-fledged member nor a complete outsider. Sometimes, in fact, the ob server himself is unclear about his role; he may be a sympathizer or even a genuine member oi the organization that he is observing, or he may be come committed to it as his research proceeds. In view of these ambiguities, the members of the group may come to accept the observer and act "naturally" in his presence. They may thus re veal information that they might prefer to keep private, nut because they are uninformed about the observer's purposes, but because they have learned to ignore him. As a matter of fact, the success of a participant observer can be measured precisely by the extent to which he stays in the background, without intruding in the normal flow of activities, and is ignored by tbe members of the group. In and of itself, this slate of affairs is not objection able from an ethical point of view. If tbe observer has explained fully the purposes of bis research, 998 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST then the group members are aware of his interest in observing the normal, spontaneous flow of their activities. Once they have agreed to this arrange ment, it is up to them to lake tbe necessary steps i( there are certain aspects of their normal activities that they would rather keep private. Ethical prob lems arise, however, when the observer deliberately takes advantage of the ambiguity of bis role to seduce group members to give him information that they might not have revealed otherwise This would happen, for example, if by implying a greater level of commitment to the organization than he actually felt, he gained access to esoteric knowledge or LO the inner circle of organizational decision making. The temptation to lake advantage of the ambigui ties inherent in his role places a considerable ethical burden on the participanl observer.
Research in natural settings that uses unobtru sive measures-that is, in which the investigator makes systematic observations of some aspect of his subjects' behavior without their awareness that these observations are taking place-presents proh lems similar to \hose of unacknowledged partici pant observation. The ethical issues are less severe when the observations focus on naturally occurring events that are essentially public-for example, on behavior in streets, in trains, in restaurants, or in department stores. In these situations, the subject clearly knows that his behavior is observable by outsiders: what he does not know is that some of these outsiders are there specifically for the purpose of making systematic observations of his behavior. Greater ambiguities arise when the social scientist has gained access to observations tbat are not gen erally public, or when he has introduced experi mental manipulations into the natural situation.
The experimental manipulation of natural set tings may take various forms. In one of the oldest studies in this genre, Hartmann (1936) systemati cally varied the type of appeal used in political leaflets sent out to different segments of the popu· lation in the course oi an actual election campaign and then compared the eiTectiveness of these ap peals. In other studies, experimenters stage lillie happenings in public places or make certain re quests 01 passersby or sales clerks, and then ob serve their reactions; by varying systematically some aspect of the staged event or of the request, they are able to assess the effects of relevant ex perimental variables. The nsc of experiments in natural settings has increased greatly in recent years, partly in response to the increasing realiza tion of the limitations of laboratory experiments in social psychology. Some bighly ingenious natural istic experiments have been and are being carried out, for example, in the area of helping behavior (e.g., Bryan & Test, 1967j Latane, 1970 Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969) . Campbell (1969) has argned very persuasively for the value of this type of research in "producing a nontrivial social science {p.3701." Its nniqne value, however, rests on the fact that the subject is unaware of his participation in an experiment-and this is precisely one of the more disturbing features of this type of research from an ethical point of view. The laboratory ex periment, even when it uses deception, at least gives the subject the chance to decide whether or not to participate; the naturalistic experiment, of the type discussed here, deprives him of that choice.
There is, of course, as Campbell pointed out, considerable variation in the severity of the ethical problems raised by different experiments in this genre. On the one hand, we may have a study in which some minor variations are introduced in an ongoing activity, such as a street collection for a charity or a solicitation of signatures on a petition; the variation may consist in the status of the solicitor (his age, his style of dress) or in the presence of a positive or negative model. This type of study presents no serious ethical problems. The deception and intrusion involved are rather mild since "thc experimental treatment falls within the range of the respondent's ordinary experience, merely being an experimental rearrangement of normal-level communications [Campbell, 1969, p. 371) ." At the other extreme, to take a hypotheti cal example, we may have a study in which the experimenter's accomplice feigns a heart attack in a public place under varying experimental condi tions and an observer notes the amount and type of help that people offer him. Such a procedure, on the basis of a rather massive deception, places the subject in a situation that may constitute a considerable imposition and that may (whether or not he decides to help the Victim) he very disturb ing to him-without giving bim any choice in the matter at all. The fact that such events may occur naturally does not, of course, justify staging them for research purposes. In the long run, the pro liferation of such experiments would add to tbe already considerable degree of deceit and irration ality that pervades modern life. Increasing public awareness that such experiments are taking place would add not only to the "pollution" of the re search environment, wbich I have already men tioned, but also to the ambiguity of real-life situ ations that call for helping behavior. In some respects, the long-term implications of active de ception in naturalistic experiments are even more disquieting than those in laboratory experiments, since the laboratory at least represents a situation that is by definition isolated from the rest of life and in which the subject is aware that certain unusual procedures are likely to be introduced.
Research based on the use of unobtrusive mea sures and disguised experimental treatments again presents us with a difficnlt dilemma. It certainly can be argued that, from a methodological point of view, social research is often at its best when the subject is unaware thaL he is being studied. Such research also may yield knowledge that may be of great social significance-such as knowledge about the conditions nuder which people will ex tend or refuse help to those in need. Yet, there are some difficult ethical problems inherent in this type of research. As in other lines of research, the severity of the ethical problems raised by the research must be weighed against its importance and the unavailability of alternative procedures.
Survey research, which generally is carried out in the setting of the respondent's home, is less beset by problems of deception and disguise than some of the other approaches that have been dis cussed so far. It may, of course, happen that a survey researcher will misrepresent the organiza tion that is conducting the surveyor the overall purpose of the survey. Such misrepresentations, however, arc in no way inherent in survey method ology and are frowned upon by reputable survey research organizations. On the other hand, the in vestigator does not necessarily give the respondent complete information about the study. Although the purpose of the interview is often transparent and the questions straightforward, the interviewer may be pursuing certain specific hypotheses that he does not reveal to the respondent, and he de liberately may introduce some questions that are indirect or that have no obvious relationship to the topic of the interview. A.s long as the interview is not marked by any major hidden agenda, how ever, the pursuit of such hypotheses and the use of such questions are well within the terms of the AMERrcAN PSYCHOLOGIST' Novnllu:R 1972 • 999 contract formed when the respondent agrees to be interviewed.
There are certain other ethical problems that survey research brings into focus. The mere fact that an interviewer arrives at someone's doorstep to ask questions, often without prior arrangement, may represent an imposition and an unacceptable invasion of privacy It may place the respondent in a position of being induced to reveal information that he might prefer not to reveal. If be does not have any information about a subject on which he is questioned, or if he lacks an opinion on a matter on which he feels that he is expected to have an opinion (and the very fact that he is asked ques tions on the topic implies such an expectation}, then he may feel embarrassed and exposed and he may experience a lowering of his self-esteem. Some times he may feet embarrassed and uncomfortable about the opinions that he does have, since he may feci that the interviewer disapproves (If them. A well-trained interviewer, of course, does not com municate disapproval and structures the situation so that the respondent will not experience any em barrassment, but the possibility of such reactions still remains. I do not wish to imply that these are, in most cases, profoundly disturbing experi ences; in many respects, as Warwick (1971) bas pointed out, the experience of being interviewed may in fact be highly rewarding for the respondent. It must be remembered, however, that survey re search does represent some invasion of privacy, which is particularly troublesome if the respondent {eels a lack 01" choice about his participation in the interview. From a broader social point of view, there is also the quesvicn cl the extent to which the proliferation of survey research may add to the already considerable erosion o{ privacy ill our society.
\Vhen interviews, questionnaires, or psychological tests are administered to a delimited population such as the workers in an industrial firm, the stu dents in a high school, or the welfare recipients in a community-then the problem of anonymity takes on special significance. If an individual's responses became known to the factory manage ment, the school administration, or the welfare agency, they might have potentially damaging con sequences Ior him. Under such circumstances, negligence in protecting the respondent's anonymity would constitute a serious ethical violation. In reporting his findings, the investigator must remove 1000 • NOVEA-mER: 1972 • A;o,mRlCAN PSYCHOLOGIST not only the names of the respondents, but also any other information that might-given the con text of a delimited organization or community provide clues to his identity. If, in fact, the data collected are to be used not only for purposes of research, but also for some subsequent decisions about individual respondents-for example, de. clskms relating to their employment status or their admission to an educational program-tben the in vestigator must make it perfectly clear at the out, set that the usual guarantees of anonymity do not hold. It would be very dangerous, from the point of view both of the rights of the subject and of the integrity of social research, for an investigator to countenance any ambiguity between research uses and administrative uses of his procedures.
Even when the anonymity of the individual re spondent is clearly assured, the research may have potentially damaging consequences for any group whose data are reported separately. For example findings in a survey conducted in an industrial organization about the distnhution of attitudes in different units may provide the basis [or a re organization or some special treatment of one or another of these units; these changes mayor may not be desirable from the point of view of the workers involved. These are the types of concerns that have made some members of the black com munity wary of questionnaires and psychological tests. They are afraid that responses of blacks (e.g., on children's achievement tests) may corn, pare unfavorably with those of whites (because of biased instruments or for other reasons), and that these findings may then be used to their group's disadvantage in the formulation of policy decisions. The basic concern here, actually, is with the prod uct ot the research and the social uses to which it is put-issues that I pursue in a later section. For the present purposes, the main point is that mem bers of a minority group may [eel that participation in this type of research would increase tbeir vul nerability, and that these feelings often may be justified. Under the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the investigator to conduct and communicate his research in a way that will minimize the vul nerability of the group he studies, and to afford his potential subjects a genuine choice about their participation in the research, When research in the black or other minority communities is carried out by while investigators, it also raises special questions about the invasion of the group's privacy and exploitation 01 its re SO\lfCes by outsiders. These concerns, as well as the concern about the danger that information re vealed in the course of the research may be dam, aging to the interests of the community, are Very similar to those that have arisen in the context of research in foreign areas. Along with other social scientists, I have been concerned particularly about the implications of researcb conducted by American or European scholars in developing countries (see Kelman, 1968, chaps. .3 and 4) . Some of the problems that arise in this setting have been high lighted by such incidents as Project Camelot (see Horowitz, 1967) . In foreign area research, the general concern with invasion of privacy is exacer, bated by the fact that the researcher is a foreigner who will report his findings to other foreigners; the subjects easily can feel that they are being treated as specimens to be put on display before a curious \ audience that may denigrate their way of life be cause of insufficient understanding of it or sym pathy for it. Concern with exploitation arises par ticularly when investigators from industrialized nations come into less-developed countries to col lect data for their own research, often with the aelp of local resources, and then export these data to advance their own careers abroad without mak ing sure that sufficient benefits accrue to the so ciety providing tbe data. Finally, there is the concern that research by outsiders in less-developed areas may represent direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of the countries studied, or at least that it may be used, in some fashion, to promote the interests of the more powerful sponsoring COun try at the expense of the weaker and poorer host country. Project Camelot is a good example of a research program that created resentment and sus picion in Latin America, where many saw it as having been designed for purposes of intelligence and intervention. Although there is no e\'idence that the project was designed for these purposes, the auspices under which it was organized and the framework within which it was conceived made these suspicions more than reasonable. Much of social research carried out in developing countries has been quite oblivious to these ethical issues, but since the fiasco 01 Project Camelot they have beeu discussed widely aud considered seriously amoug social scientists.
My discussion of the many ethical problems en gendered by social research in i1.5 various settings was not meant to imply that all social research is an ethical morass. I bave mentioned various prac tices and consequences because they can and do occur, not necessarily because they are typical oc currences. SOme are fairly widespread, being built into particular research traditions; otbers are Quite rare. In large proportions of social research, the subject's treatment can by no means be described as degrading, overly intrusive, or potentially harm ful. In fact, participation in social research often may represent an enriching and personally satis lying experience for the subject. In short, I am not proposing that any 01 the lines of research that I have discussed ought to be abandoned (al though some do deserve serious reexamination, Ircm an ethical as well as a methodological point of view). My purpose is to point out ethical pit falls that call for our active awareness.
There are various ways of looking at the ethical pitfalls that I have enumerated. In keeping with Lhe conceptual orientation 01 the present article, I shall look at them as Questions about lbe way in which the social researcher uses his power. Re. search procedures that involve potential ethical violations correspond to illegitimate uses of the investigator's power. Wben we say that an in vestigator has invaded a domain that the subject has the right to keep private, or that he has limited the subject's freedom 10 decide on his own partici pation or to protect his own interests, or that he has induced the subject to take actions or reveal information that may be personally damaging to him, or that he has been unresponsive to the norms of the group be has studied, we are in effect sug gesting that he may have abused his power-that he may have used it in an arbitrary fashion. The legitimate usc of power presupposes adherence to shared norms that govern the relationship between the two parties. The central norm governing the relationship of investigator and subject is that of voluntary informed consent, and ethical problems generally arise because this norm has been vio lated or circumvented. Voluntary consent is im possible to the extent that the subjects constitute a captive audience or are unaware of the fact that they are being studied. Informed consent is im possible to the extent that subjects' particlpatinu h solicited uuder false pretenses or they are deceived about the true nature of the research. If investi gators were to adhere scrupulously to the norm of consent and related principles, then most of the ethical problems would be avoided or corrected for readily. The question is how such adherence can be facilitated.
Some Corrective Approaches
In the discussion of illustrative problems, I have indicated either explicitly or implicitly some of the directions tbat solutions might take. It is quite clear that most of the problems indeed could be resolved or at least minimized with strict adherence to the norm of voluntary informed consent When subjects have given their full consent, invasion of privacy is no longer a major ethical issue, since "consent to participate actually constitutes con sent to relinquish certain areas 01 privacy that might otherwise have been enjoyed and protected [Parsons, 1969, p. 352J ." Subjecting a subject 10 an uncomfortable or disturhiog experience, even if it entails some risk of longer term consequences, is ethically acceptable if the subject has freely agreed to participate in full knowledge of the risks involved. Even experimental deception becomes ethically unobjectionable if the subject has agreed LO participate in lull knowledge that he may be given some false or incomplete information in the course 01 an experiment (see Campbell, 1969, p. 370; Mead, 1969, p. 371) .
Commitment La the principle 01 voluntary in formed consent, however, cannot by itself resolve the major ethical issues, since a great deal depends on the degree to which and the manner in which the principle is implemented. Implementation of the principle is by lIO means straightforward; there is no simple, universally acceptable set of rules that can be followed. Total adherence to the principle is impossible if any research is to take place at all. For one thing, many kinds of re search-such as research with small children, or research using unobtrusive measuresc-wnuld have to be ruled out entirely, unless the principle is ad justed to special circumstances. Even if we were prepared to rule out all such research, a literal ad herence to the principle would be physically im possible (see Parsons, 1969) . The investigator cannot give the subject the precise reason lor every question he asks and every procedure he uses, nor can he remove from his sample all those who cou ceivably might be participating out of some sense of obligation. Thus, the operational meaning of voluntary informed consent must remain in an area of judgment. In implemenLing the principle, some decision has to be made about what constitutes, under varying circumstances, consent that is suffi ciently voluntary and sufficiently informed. Fur thermore, implementation usually involves some translation of the principle into a. specific proce dure, such as the signing of a consent form. Any such procedure easily can become routinized and ritualized, thus pushing the ethical issue just one step further back. That is, it is quite possible for subjects to be deprived of the opportunity for voluntary informed consent to the act of signing the consent forms, as has indeed happened in cer tain areas of medica! research (see, e.g., Lear, (966).
Since implementing the principle 01 voluntary informed consent requires subjective judgments and is open to the possibility 01 routinized tokenism, we clearly need more than a set of formal proce dures to insure genuine consent. The atmosphere and structure of the investigator-subject interaction must be such that the subject has both the oppor tunity and the capacity to make meaningful choices. It is in this context that my earlier re marks about the power relationship between in vestigator and subject become particularly ger mane. The subject's relative power deficiency makes it difficult aud sometimes impossible (0 achieve a genuinely voluntary informed consent. Power deficiencies deriving from the subject's posi tion in the society or organization lend to militate against volulltory consent. Members of low-status or dependent groups are limited (or at least feel limited) in their ability to withhold consent, both 011 the point of recruitment as subjects and at other choice points throughout the research. Quite often, they do not feel free to refuse participation, to abstain from procedures that they find distasteful, or to withdraw lrom the study once it is underway. In short, they are less able to mount countervailing power against that of the investigator and thus have less control over their participation and ex periences as subjects. Power deficiencies deriving from the subject's position within the research situ ation proper tend to militate against ill/armed con sent. Since the research situation is constructed by the investigator and defined in his terms, the sub ject must depend on him for the infnrmation he needs in deciding about his own participation and continuation in the study. His information thus tends to be limited, particularly if he is deceived ID02 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST about the nature of the experiment or kept in the dark about certain features of the situation.
To create the structural conditions for more truly voluntary informed cousent, we need collective efforts and institutional mechanisms that will help (0 overcome the subject's power deficiency by in creasing his participation in the research and, most importantly, by providing him with countervailing power in his relationship to the investigator. The need is not just for greater sensitivity and goodwill on the part of the investigator (though these tOO are essential), but for institutionalized patterns that would define the rights and ohltganons vested in the role of both investigator and subject. Such patterns would be designed to assure that the norm of voluntary informed consent is adhered to as fully and as scrupulously as possible; and, to the extent that other necessities dictate certain adjustments in adherence to this norm, that such adjustments are kept within the limits of legitimacy. I mention here some of the forms that such institu tionalized mechanisms might take in four cete gortes: patterns of research, patterns of training, mechanisms of protection, and mechanisms of accountability.
Patterns of research. A major barrier to cor recting ethically questionable procedures in social research is the fact that some of these procedures have become institutionalized. For example, the use of deception has been a standard feature of sodal-psycholcgical experimeuts for some time; de ception experiments have served as the basis for many PhD theses and many journal articles; in [act, some major research traditions are built al most entirely on this procedure. Under these cir cumstances, even an investigator who has uecome sensitive to the ethical implications of the proce dures he uses and concerned about tbem finds it difficult to abandon them entirely. He may try to correct {or them-as many social psychologists have doue, for example, by giving careful attention Lo the postexpenmeetal feedback, in which they explain to the subjects the nature of the deceptlcn and the reasons for its use-but such corrections, though valuable, are designed (0 retain raH,er than to ahaudon the basic procedure. No scientist will give up readily a procedure that has beeu success ful in producing results (both in terms of scientific knowledge and in terms of career advancement). Change does take place, however, within a com muuity of scientists if new procedures are developed and prove to be at least as effective in producing results as the old procedures. One major corrective approach, then, to the ethical ambiguities or social research is the active development and the institutionalization of ener native research models that call for an ethically sounder relationship between investigator and sub ject. The models I have in mind can be character ized as participatory research, in that they are de. signed to involve the subject as an active partici pant in a joint eflort with the investigator. The procedures would depend on the subject's positive motivations to contribute to the research enter prise-because he has been persuaded of the im portance of the research, or because he finds the procedures intrinsically rewarding, or because he [eels that he has a unique contribution to make, or because he has a special slake in the outcome of the investigation. Unlike many of the procedures that are now iu common usc, participatory research would "call for increasing the sophistication of notelltial subjects, rather than maintaining tbeir unrvete [Kelman, 1968, p. 225] ." Participatory research does not necessarily imply complete equal i~y between investigator and subject. For example, the luvestigator-c-because of his greater expertise aud because of the nature of his interest in the euterprise-c-would usually playa more central role in designing the research and in definillg the tasks to be performed by the subject. Though the roles of the two parties are bound to be different, the relatiouship between them would be one of genuine partnership; the subject, along wi'h the investi gator, would be interested personally in the process or outcome of the research and involved actively in making it a success. This kind of model would go a long way toward removing the power dlscrep anctes between investigator and subject.
Research models of the type I am proposing are by no means new; many of the procedures used hy various groups of social scientists clearly meet the criteria of participatory research. What I am proposing is that these procedures be extended to wider areas of social research and that they be more fully developed and institutionalized. In experimental social psychology, the search for more participatory research approaches might take the form of further exploration and development of procedures based OU some form of role playiug (Kelman, 1968, pp. 223-225) . In role-playing experiments, observations and data are provided by !\MERICAN P~YcH()LOGIST • NOVJ;;MDf;J{ 1972 • 1003 the subject's performance in what he knows to be a make-believe situation. Subjects can become highly involved in a role-playing experience, both because tbe laboratory situation may be inherently engrossing and because their interest in actively contributing to the research may have been mobl Heed. Role-playing experiments may take various forms. Perhaps the simplest form is one that repli cates a standard laboratory experiment, except that the subject is told ahead of time that the experimental manipulations are make believe; in other words, the subject is asked to play the role of a subject in a deception experiment." A form of role playing that may on occasion be very elaborate and complex involves laboratory simula, tion, in which subjects are asked to take roles in a laboratory model of some aspect of fhe real world (e.g., the roles of political decision makers in the international system); here the subject is asked Lo playa real-life role, rather than merely the role of a subject. Another variant of role playing makes use of structured game situations, which (like "Monopoly" or other parlor games) can he highly involving, even though the participant knows that "it is only a game." I do not believe that all of the phenomena with which experimental social psy chologists have been concerned can suitably be studied throngh role-playing techniques; I do be lieve, however, that the potential uses of these tech niques are greater than we have realized so far. There is a need to explore the circumstances under which role-playing techniques would be suitable-c-or more precisely, the specific purposes to which dif ferent types of role playing can be applied.
In survey research, it is commonly assumed that "elite interviews"-that is, interviews with political leaders, business leaders, or other high-status per sonages-require a somewhat different orientation than ordinary interviews. Usually, ill structuring
• Some c-trks 01 role·phyiog experiments (e.g., Freedman, 1969) have cqu~ted atl role playing with lhis particular subtype of role playing. I lend \0 agree lhat lhis type oC role playing is fairly limited in i15 usdulne<s, although [ (eel that for certain purposes it may be quite valuable and-c-depending on the particular procedures used-it may prodUce "real" behavior, not merely (a~ Freedman claims) "people's gueS'e~ as to how tbey would behave jf they ..... ere in a particular snuauee." Beyond that, hnwevtr, Freedman ignores ~ll of the olher terms of role-playing procedures which ran l',encrate levels of realism, spontaneity, and involvement rar greater than these obtained in the tradlticnal deceplion experiment.
such an interview, the interviewer makes it clear to the respondent that be regards him as an expert wbo can make a unique contribution to the research enterprise by drawing on bis special knowledge and experience. Tbe respondent thus becomes an active partner in the research, wbo gains satisfaction from the utilization of his expertise and the knowledge that he is making a unique contribution. This kind of orientation is characteristic of the inter views conducted by anthropologists witb informants in the field (see Mead, 1969) . One way of moving in the direction of more participatory research would be to extend this model to all survey inter views-e-tc treat all respondents as elite respondents. To be sure, the respondent in a sample survey is not selected because of his expertise, but he does have special knowledge and experience Lo bring to the interview. The interview is concerned with his personal opinions, beliefs, and expertences-cmauers on which he clearly has unique information to con tribute. When the interview is oriented toward these special contributions, it becomes more of a partnership in a joint enterprise for the two participants.
Community and organizational studies may take the form of action research, in which social research and an action program are linked directly to one another. In such research, the investigator works with groups that are concerned with improving their Iunctiorung or have decided to introduce a program of change. Tbe research is governed by the requirements of the action program and is related integrally to it. Action research projects may differ in the extent to which the responsibility for the design and execution of the research is in the hands of the participants, and in the extent to which the research is an actual component of the action program or an activity parallel to it. In either case, however, tbe research grows out of the needs of the community or organization studied and is designed to facilitate the goals of tbe mem bers. Clearly, this model is not applicable 10 all community or organizational studies, but to the extent to which it can be used, the research would take on a lruly participatory character.
None of these examples of participatory research provides a completely satisfactory solution to the ethical dilemmas that have been raised. From a methodological point of view, there are some sig nificant problems that probably cannot be investi gated with participatory techniques. Clearly, these techniques are not suited for tbe study of pee norncna that tend Lo disappear once a person is aware of being observed. Even from an ethical point of view, participatory research is not en tirely free of ambiguities. It is possible that these techniques too may become rnutlnized and ritual ized, thus creating the impression of participation without genuinely involving the subject in the reo search process. Nevertheless, the Inrther develop ment and institutionalization of participatory models ot social researcb would provide some mean ingful alternatives for those social scientists who are concerned about the unequal relationship be tween investigator and subject.
Patterns of training. One of the ways of institu tionalizing concern for the rights of their subjects among social scientists is to build it into the defini tion of their professional role-which in turn means making it an integral component of professional training. Certain ethical ccncerns-c-surh as respect for confidentiality of subjects' responses-s-have traditionally been important parts of the normative structure of social research. Other issues, how ever, have tended to be ignored in the course of professional trainlug ; in fact, to become a fully trained social researcher a student often has had to learn to overcome whatever compunctions he might have had about deceiving his subjects or invading their privacy. It is not that social researchers as human beings have been concerned any less with these issues than anyone else; often, however, they have not been concerned with them as social scien tists. To correct for some of the ethical problems arising in social research, norms for the treatment of subjects must become a central part of the op erational code of social scientists, alongside of norms for proper methodology or honest reporting.
Concern with the rights of the subject will be come part of the social researcher's operational code if he is sensitized to the issues in the course of his training and if this sensitivity is reinforced throughout his professional career-as is true, for example, in the case of methodological issues. The institutionalization of ethical review procedures helps to increase such sensitivity. The develop ment of ethical codes is also useful, not simply from the point of view 01 settiug and enforcing uorrns, but from the point of view of providing needed educational materials. Social science associations are now givlug attention increasingly to the de velopment or extension of such codes. The Aroerl can Psychological Association, for example, bas had an ethical code for some time, but it bas focused more heavily on the psychologist's relationship to dients in a professional context than on his rela tionship to subjects in a research context. Re cently, an ad hoc Committee on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research was established by the APA with the explicit mission of exploring in de tail the ethical issues in research with humau sub jects. The Committee's proposals have stimulated a lively debate within the profession. Its work is not yet completed, but has already led to greater specification of ethical standards governing the in vestigator-subject relationship and generated use ful inputs 10 the training process (see Cook, Hicks, Kimble, McGuire, Schogge», & Smith, 1972) .
, ,
Mechanisms of pratecti01l. To counteract the subject's power deficiency, there is a need for Iur. ther development of institutionalized mechanisms designed to protect the subject's interests. One such mechanism is the establishment of committees to review research proposals from the point of view of tbelr implications for the rights of the subject. Such committees have been set up by now in most universities and research institutes, in compliance with regulations issued by the Uutted States Pub lic Health Service requiring a special intrainstltu, tional review of all proposals submitted to that ageucy in which human subjects are used. The re view is designed to assure that the subject's wel fare is safeguarded adequately and that appropriate steps are taken to obtain his consent. Such a com mittee is useful to the extent that it is taken seri ously, as an opportunity to correct for existing power imbalances; insofar as the committee is viewed primarily as a way of complying with regulations of the sponsoring agency, there is a danger that the review process may become rou tinized. Even when the committee is taken serl cusly, its composition may make a considerable difference. rr it consists entirely of individuals in the same field as the proposal under review, there may be a great reluctance 10 turn down any pro posal, both because of considerations of colleague ship and because the researcher aud the reviewers would tend to be tied iuto the same set of ideas about standard, accepted procedures in tbe field. It is very important, therefore, for review com mittees to include at least some members wbo come from different disciplines and thus bring different biases and perspectives to hear on the choice of AMERICAN PSYCHOLOCrsT • NOVEMBER 1972 • 1005 research procedures. There may be some ad vantage, in fact, in having on the committee some individuals who are not members of the institution and who can serve 3.5 representatives of "the pub lic." On the otber hand, there is a danger that a committee that is too far removed from the re search under consideration may-in its eagerness to protect the rights of the subject-interfere with the rights of tbe investigator to the free pursuit of his research. Clearly, review committees must be so structured and composed that the rights of both parties will be given serious and respectful consideration.
Another mecbanisrn of protection is provided through the codes of ethics that have been adopted now by the various professional associations in the social sciences. These codes serve to protect the rights of subjects by defining the obligations of investigators and setting limits on what they may do in their relationship to their subjects. In the formulation and revision of such codes, it would be important to have the subjects' point of view repre sented. There may be some advantage, in fact, in complementing such codes with a document written explicitly from the point of view of the subject-a "subjects' bill of rights." Such a document might spell out in detail the appropriate ways of obtain ing consent under various circumstances. There are two rights that are central and that any sucb document would have to feature: the right to refuse participation in a study, and the right to withdraw from it. If these rights are observed scrupulously, then many other problems will take care of them selves since investigators clearly would have to persuade their subjects to participate and continne in the research.
The question of what kind of group might com pose a "subjects' bill of rights" brings to mind the idea of a subjects' union that some observers have suggested. I find it difficult to conceive of a gen eral union of subjects since so much of social re search is carried out with specific groups, investi gated on a one-time basis; in other words, it does not Involve a specifiable population [rom which in vestigators repeatedly draw their subjects. The formation of a subjects' union is quite feasible, however, in special settings-such as a university campus or a research hospital-in which investi gators regularly draw on a segment of the popula tion to obtain subjects for their research. For example, many psychology departments have in stituted some form of subject pool (see King, 1970) ; a subjects' union might be a very appropri ate agency to represent the interests of subjects in negotiations wilb the managers of such a pool.
MechaniHllS oj accorm/ahility. A crucial condi tion for the legitimate use of the investigator's power is the availability of some recourse to the subject if he feels that his rights have been vio lated. There bave to be some mechanisms for holding the investigator accountable when he over steps the limits of his authority in dealings with his subjects. The legal system provides such rnecba nisms in extreme cases. Many of the violations of subjects' rights, however, do not fall clearly within the terms of existing laws; also, the recourse to legal procedures is so cumbersome and expensive that subjects generally would be reluctant to use it. Another mechanism Of accountability is pro vided by the ethics committees of professional as sociations, which can act on a complaint submitted by a subject who feels that a member of the as, suciarion h3.5 violated the association's own ethical code. Though ethics committees, such 3.5 that of the American Psychological Association, have dealt in the past mostly with complaints growing out of the professional-client relationship, there is no rea son why they cannot deal with complaints growing out of the investigator-subject relationship, par ticularly as ethical codes are developed to givc more specific attention to this relationship.
The mechanism of the ethics committee raises one serious question: Does an investigator's ac countability to a group consisting entirely or col leagues within bis own profession provide enougb countervailing power to the subject who [eels that h'ls rights have been violated? Is there perhaps some need for external controls, at least to supple ment the intraprofessional ones? For a variety of reasons, 1 believe that governmental regulatory commissions are not the answer; I am afraid tbal they might greatly inhibit freedom or research without really providing effective recourse lor in dividual subjects. On the other hand-as in the case of the research review comrnlttee-c-I feel that there is a real need to bring some outside perspec tives to bear on evaluation of the investigator's ac tivities. It is essential, however, that this be done in a context in which freedom of research is re spected as a basic social value. One possibility would be to consider broadening the perspective of tbe professional ethics committees by including on them, as members or as consultants, some repre sentatives of outside points of view, Another mechanism that I see as a potentially very valuable supplemenl to the professional ethics committee would be the appointment of an ombudsman, who would receive complaints from subjects and repre sent their interests in dealings with individual in vestigaLors, research institutions, or professional associations. Such an ombudsman might function within any large research institution or within a professional association. It is my hope that such intraprofessional mechanisms of accountability, de signed to strengthen the subject's countervailing power, will be explored more fully before we move in the direction of greater external controls,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE PROOUCTS OF SOCIAL REsEARCH
If knowledge is power, then the knowledge pro duced by social research is, to a large extent, power to conLrol and manipulate human behavior. The producLion of such knowledge creates difficult ethical dilemmas for the social scientist, particularly when he considers who is likely to use the power to manipulate, over whom, and to what ends. I have discussed some of these genera! ethical issues elsewhere (Kelman, 1968, chap. I) . For the present purposes, I shall focus more narrowly on the implications of the knowledge produced by social research for the differential control of some segments of the population over others-an issue that touches directly on our concern with the rights of the subject.
In general, it can be said that those who produce social research-both the research sponsors and the investigators-are in a position to gain some rela tive advantage from it. They have the opportunity to define the problem to which the research will be addressed and thus to make it relevant to their particular interests; they also have the capacity and the resources to make use of the research findings, On the other hand, those who supply the data rnny very well place themselves in a more disadvantageous position, Whatever information they make available about themselves conceivably cnn be used Lo control their subsequent behavior. If all segments of a society participated equally as both researchers and subjects, then the relative advantages and disadvantages brought about by these two roles would, in the long run, balance themselves out. Since these roles are not dis tributed evenly within our society, however-since the less powerful segments of the society provide a disproportionately large number of the subjects and a disproportionately small number of the producers and users of social research-there is a real pos sibility that social research may serve to strengthen the established segments of the society at the ex pense of the disadvantaged. Sucb a possibility raises some difficult questions about the rigbts of the subject, since his participation in the research may have some damaging consequences for his group.
Considerations of this sort underlie many of the criticisms of social research-or of certain lines of social research-that are being voiced increasingly by activists in the black, the poor, and the student communities, They resent the fact that they are being used as subjects, complaining that "by focus ing research attention on them, social scientists are placing them in a position where they can be more readily controlled and manipulated in the interests of the established powers [Kelman, 1970a, p. 97] ." I do not feel that there is anything inherent in the nature of social science that works to the disad. vantage of the powerless, or that the overall impact of social research has been in that direction, On the contrary, social research is potentially a power ful tool for social change and has in fact made im portant contributions to that end, Nevertheless, as long as the power relationship between the in vestigator and the subject remains as imbalanced as it has tended to be, there is a real possibility that social research may further increase the dis advantage of those who are already disadvantaged. I shall mention some illustrative problems and in dicate what, in my view, they do and do not imply about the overall impact of social research, be fore turning to a discussion of some correcitve approaches,
Some Illustrative Problems
Perhaps the clearest example of the use of social research hy the powerful for the direct manipula tion of the powerless is provided by some of the counterinsurgency activities carried on by the United States military and other agencies in de veloping countries, Project Camelot (see Horo. witz, 1967) , which has already been mentioned, is by now a classic example of such research, even though it was discontinued before any data ac tually had been gathered. It is important to recall AMERICAN PSYClIoLOGrST • NOVEMBER 1972 • 1007 that Project Camelot was not an operational reo search program designed lo help the United Slates Army carry out counterinsurgency missions in Latin America; rather, it was designed as unclas sified, basic research on the causes and prevention 01 internal conflict in developing nations. Since the research was sponsored hy the Army, however, and since its theoretical questions were formulated within the Army's counterinsurgency framework, there is reason to believe that-a-whatever lhe theo retical interests of Ihe investigators may have been -the findings would have been most directly rele vant to the Army's counterinsurgency mission. A recent article hy Wolf and Jorgensen (l970) pro vides apparently more blatant examples of the in volvement of American social scientists in counter insurgency programs in Thailand. According to the authors, "these programs comprise efforts at the manipulation of people on a giant scale and inter twine straightforward anthropological research with overt and covert ccurner-Iosurgency activities [p. 26] ." In sponsoring such programs, the United States government "is less interested in the eco nomic, social, or political causes of discontent than in techniques of neutralizing individual or collec tive protest (p. 34J." Wolf and Jorgensen cite one research proposal that is designed specifically to help in the development of such techniques. They also descrihe a "Tribal Data Center," whose pur pose is La bring together and process data on tribal villages and their residents and, from all in dications, to make these available for counterin surgency uses. Such data, it seems, are being pro vided by social scientists, including anthropologists engaged in legitimate ethnographic studies, who mayor may not be aware of the uses to which these data may be put. Some of the data re quested by lhe Tribal Data Center, it should be noted, are of a kind that anthropologists tradi tionally have kept confidential. The information available on these activities is still very sketchy, hut they serve to illustrate the possible ways in which data provided by relatively powerless groups may be used to their disadvantage.
The examples from counterinsurgency illustrate the possibility of social research conducted in a way Of under conditions that make its products very directly applicable to the control and manipu lation of disadvantaged populations, either because the explicit purpose of the research is to provide such information or because the: sponsorsbip of the research makes snch application almost in. evitahle regardless of the purposes of the investi. gator. There are other kinds of research that do not have this direct link to manipulative activities hut whose products could well lend themselves to such purposes. Research on deviant behavior, though it may be completely independent from the operations of any mission-oriented agencies, etten is carried ont from the perspective of control or prevention of social deviance. As I mentioned earlier, this tendency may reflect the concerns of agencies sponsoring such research, or the concerns of the social scientists themselves. In any event, it influences the kinds of questions to which the research addresses itself and hence the kinds of data that the research produces. For example, mucb of this research [OCU3CS on tbe deviant bebavinr it self and Oil the characteri.!.\.k~ of the individuals and groups that mar>ifest it and the families and neighocrhoods in which it is prevalent, rather tban 01> the s}'stemic processes out of Which it emerges [Kelman, I9'iOb, p. en.
IL thns "points more readily to ways of controlling or at best preventing deviant behavior than it does to ways of restructuring the social realities that are indexed by this behavior [p. 83] ."
The data produced by such research could be used directly for purposes of control. This can be seen most clearly in connection with political devi ants, such as college protesters or ghetto rioters. Some critics have pointed out, for example, that in formation on the social and psychological charac teristics of protesters might be used by college administrations for the purpose of weeding out protest-prone students at the point of admission. Or, information on the involvement of various seg ments of a ghetto population in riots could be used to break up all groups that potentially might serve as the focal points for a future riot. The control and prevention of riots and destructive forms of social deviance are legitimate social goals, but r am speaking here of attempts to prevent such activities by repressing those who potentially might engage in them-in other words, to prevent the manifesta tions of violent protest rather rban its causes. Such attempts can only increase the disadvantage of the powerless by blocking their efforts to change the conditions of their lives. There are, of course, studies of student protesters (e.g., Flacks, 1967) and 01 black militants (e.g., Tomlinson, 1970) that are oriented toward social change rather than social lQQ8 • NOVE1>lBER 1972 • AMERIC,\N PSYCHOLOGIST control. Even the findings of such studies con. ceivably could be used for repressive purposes. However, if one goes beyond the possible use of isolated findings, it stands to reason that the products of a research program taking tbe problem of control of deviance-cor more particularly of protest-as its point of departure are more likely in the long run to be used to the disadvantage of the powerless.
This type of research may not only lend itself to direct use in controlling disadvantaged popula tions but also may have indirect consequences detri mental to the interests of such populations. By focusing on the carriers of deviant behavior (who are drawn most often from the ranks of the poor, the disadvantaged, and the minority groups) such research may reinforce [he widespread tendency to explain ~"co beonior more olten in terms of the pUholog}' of the deviant individuals, Iamilies, and communities, than in terms o( such properties of the Inger social system '1.S the distribution of power, resources, and opportunities [Kelman, 1970b, p. 831 . Ryan (1971) recently has discussed this tendency as part of a wider ideology of "blaming the victim," which social scientists have helped to perpetuate. The policies suggested by research witbin this framework "arc invariably rouceived to revamp and revise the victim, never to change the sur rounding circumstances [Ryan, 1971, p. 24J ." Ryan poiuts out that such policies are clearly in the interest of the established segments of the population in that they support the status quo. They are against the interests of the disadvantaged in two respects: they make him the target of various intrusive efforts "to change his altitudes, alter his values, fill up his cultural deficits, energize his apathetic soul, cure his character defects, train him and polish him and woo him from his savage ways [p. 24J"; aud they divert attention from more promising approaches to overcoming his disad vantage. These issues were at the heart of the debate that was generated by the Moynihan Report on the Negro family (see Rainwater & Yancey, 1967) , which emphasized the deterioration of the Negro family as the major obstacle in Negroes' ability to achieve equality. Critics of the report who included many social scientists-argued that its conclusions about the increasing pathology of the black family were not justified by the evideuce and seemed to imply that the weakness of the black family (to whatever extent it does exist) is the cause rather than the effect of blacks' disad vantaged position within the society. Tb.ey felt that the report could bave the consequence (prob ably unintended) of encouraging national policies (hat concentrate on efforts to strengthen the black family rather than efforts to provide jobs lor black men, to eliminate barriers to economic opportunity, and to correct for inequalities in the distribution of resources.
The debate about the alleged pathology of the black family raises a more general question, going beyond research that focuses on deviant behavior. Some recent critics of social research with black subjerts-c-particularly when it is carried out by white investigators-have taken the position that any research yielding data on the psychological or social characteristics of blacks, which can then be compared with data on whites, is likely to have damaging consequences for the black community. This position was developed, at least in large part, in reaction to Jensen's (1969) lengthy article, which tried to argue that the lower average IQ scores obtained by blacks as compared to whites iu many studies reflect genetic differences between the two groups. Jensen's views are by no means widely accepted by his colleagues, and his article generated a large number of critical replies, chal lenging his interpretations of the evidence. Never theless, the article received a considerable amount of publicity, and it probably provided some scien tific legitimation for those whiles who find it cou venient to believe in the intellectual interiority of blacks.
No....., it can be argued that any black-white comparisons lend themselves to this or other kinds of USe detrimental to the black community. Whether the comparison involves ability aud achievement scores, or social altitudes, or life styles, it may well put blacks in a negative light-at least from the point of view of the white middle class. Often, the observed differences between blacks and whites may be spurious, being based on biased measures or indicators. For example, black chil dren may perform more poorly on an aptitude test, not because they have le,ss of the aptitude being measured, but because the lest is more geared to the experiences of wblte middle-class children than to those of black ghetto children; the proportion of illegitimate births may he larger in the hlack community, not because there is a higher proportion AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST· NOI/EMBER (97:2 • 1009 of births out of wedlock among black women, but because there is a higher rate of reporting such births. If the observed differences are valid, their interpretation and evaluation may be subject to various biases. For example, differences in IQ may be interpreted (sometimes by psychologists themselves, and more often by nonspecialists) as reflecting innate differences in intelligence, even though such a conclusion is unwarranted by the data; differences in pauems of social behavior and attitudes may be taken as evidence of the immoral ity or disorganization of the black community be cause they are evaluated in terms of the white middle-class experience rather t.han the black ghetto experience. The unfavorable image of blacks presented by the research findings, though based on biases in measurement, interpretation, or evaluation, would become a "scientifically COn firmed" reality. As such, it might reinforce nega tive stereotypes of blaeks that already are held by the white population. It might further support negative expectations (often shared by blacks them selves) with respect to the performance of blaeks, thus helping to produce a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, it might serve 3.5 a basis for policies that are irrelevant or detrimental to the interests of blacks, because they are derived from wrong 3.5 sumptions about tbe capacities and needs of the black population.
The last set of problems has potentially very far reaching implications since it suggests that any study in which the psychological or social charac teristics of a minority or disadvantaged group are assessed-no matter who carries it out, under what auspices, and within what frame of reference-may have damaging consequences for the gronps studied. These consequences may derive from biases that enter in at the point of assessing the characteristics under study, at the point of interpreting the data, or at the point of applying the findings to the formulation or execution of policy. Certainly, similar biases have operated in the development and use of various tests, which have helped to set severe limits on the educational and occupational opportunities of blacks in American society. The possibility that such biases may operate in social research that yields comparisons between blacks or other minority groups and the majority population, and that these comparisons will be used to the dis, advantage of the minorities, is very real indeed. There are those who argue that the various prob lems I have been discussing in this section are inherent in social research. In the most extreme view, the practitioners of social research are tools 01 the establishment, and the research is designed to maintain the power and the advantage of the estahlisbmem at the expense of the powerless and disadvantaged populations. The products of re search, therefore, inevitably are used for purposes of control-for oppression of minorities and third world peoples, and for repression of protesters and insurgents. On the basis of this analysis, some critics indict social research in general; others in diet entire lines of research-such as research on minority groups or research in developing countries. Though the extreme position may not have many proponents, variants of it are heard often enough, even among social scientists, to require some com ment. 1 particularly Ieel the need to comment be cause I share a good part of the analysis On which this position is based, but 1 reject its conclusions as unlonnded and ultimately self-defeating.
The wholesale indictment of social research or of entire areas within it is based on too undiffer entiated a view of the establishment, of social scientists, and of the relationship between the two. To begin with, the notion that social scientists as a group are part of a vast conspiracy to manipulate oppressed populations in the interest of those in power is inconsistent with the facts, and an analysis that leans heavily on this notion is bound to be unproductive. The problem is far more complex and in some respects more serious since it is linked ,0 systemic forces rather than to the machinations 01 evil men. To be sure, there are social scientists who are involved in deliberate manipulative activi ties-such 3.5 the counterinsurgency programs men tioned above-for various reasons and witb varying. degrees of awareness of the type of enterprise to which they are parties. No doubt, there are more social scientists involved in such activities than is commonly known, since by their very nature these activities are usually clandestine; and there is a danger thal such involvements may increase if certain current trends in American society be come even more pervasive. Such involvements, however, are by no means the norm among social scientists; in some fundamental respects, they go against the norms of the social science community, particularly il they involve secrecy, misrepresenta tion, and violations of confidentiality. Indeed, the major criticisms of such activities have come from within the social science community itself (see Horowitz, 1967; Wolf & Jorgensen, 1970) .
The more sophisticated form of the indictment of social research is based on the notion that social scientists-both because they are beholden to the establishment agencies that sponsor their research and because of their own class positions-c-are bound to serve the interests of the elites. Therefore, whether or not they are engaged deliberately in manipulative and oppressive activities-and, in fact, even when they are oriented toward helping the poor and the powerless-the products of their re search inevitably contribute to the disadvantage of these groups. This analysis, in my view, has a great deal of merit, but it remains too undiffer entiated. First of all, the agencies that sponsor research-hath governmental and private-s-cannot be described as monolithic service stations of the status quo. To be sure, they are usually not well springs of political revolution, but they have often (if not often enough) provided stimulation for or at least been responsive to research promotive of social change. A realistic view of OUT social sys tem must recognize that creative and unconven tional ideas do, at least on occasion, emerge from the interstices of the establishment. As far as social researchers themselves arc concerned, gen erally they have not been integrated that well in the society's power structure. As highly educated professionals, they are, clearly, not among the most deprived segments of the population. Yet, they are often marginal in terms of their own social class background; and they are heirs to a strong traditlun of social criticism, of concern with social change (at least of a reformist variety), of identi, fication with the underdog, of pushing the establish ment and exposing its hypocrisies. Any analysis that ignores this historical tradition cannot give a valid account of the actual and potential role of social research in the promotion of social change.
The strength of this antiestablishment tradition within social science leads me to my second reason
[or rejecting the notion that social research is in herently a tool of the establishment. In an im portant sense, just tbe opposite is true: The ques tioning of the status quo, of the assumptions on which existing social institutions and policies are based, is at the very heart of the analysis in which the social scientist engages and is inherent in his methodology. Social science, by its nature, is de signed to bring independent analytic perspectives to bear on questions of social policy and to provide systematic bases for assessing the consequences of existing arrangements and deriving alternative policy approaches. To be sure, social research does not always perform this function effectively; the social scientist canuot free himself entirely from the dominant perspectives in his society and he is subject to various forms of cooptation. At ils best, however, social research is an essential source of alternative perspectives and thus a potentially valuable tool in any effort 10 promote social change. Social research has in fact made important con tributions to social change and produced findings that strengthen the position of the disadvantaged and powerless groups. One of its major contrihu, tions has been iu discrediting some of the com monly held myths that have provided support for white racism. Thus, while it is true that psy chological data have on occasion been used in sup. port of the notion of genetically based racial dif, Ierences in intelligence, it should not be forgotten that it is the work of psychologists and anthro pologists over a number of years that systemati cally has refuted this popular notion and made it scientifically unrespectable. Similarly, it is the work of sociologists and social psychologists that has refuted the popular tendency to attribute the disadvantage of blacks in America to some failing in their own character or social organization, by identifying the patterns of exclusion and oppression that are built into the institutions and attitudes of white America. To take another example, reo search on student protests and gbetto riots---even when it has focused on the characteristics of the participants-has helped to discredit the myths that student protesters are neurotics and that ghetto rioters are riffraff, thus making it necessary AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST' NOVEMDER 197Z • 1011 to look more carefully at the underlying causes of these actions.
All in all, then, I cannot accept the position that social research is inherently a tool of the establishment, nor do I feel that, on the whole, it has played that kind of role. Quite to the con trary, it would be sell-defeating for those of us who identify with the powerless populations to reject or undermine social research, given its actual and potential contributions to the process of social change. AL the same time, however, I feel tha t there is a very real and structural basis for the fear that some of the products of social research may be relatively disadvantageous for the power less gronps, given the power imbalance between those who sponsor and conduct the research and those who provide the data. Sucb disadvantages do not result necessarily from a deliberate attempt to control or suppress these groups, but from the normal processes that operate in the production and utilization of the researeh:
I. Those who sponsor and conduct the research are in a position to define what is problematic-e-tc decide on the questions to be asked and the frame work within which the answers are to be organised They thus determine the range of answers that will be obtained and the uses to which the knowl edge potentially can be put. Given the imbalance in wbo sponsors and conducts the research, there is a strong structural possibility that the knowledge produced will be more responsive \0 the problems seen by the more advantaged segments of the so ciety than to those of the disadvantaged segments. Unless deliberate efforts are made to bring the perspectives of the disadvantaged groups to bear on the problem-selling process, the research is likely to be at best irrelevant and at worst detri mental to the interests of these groups.
2. Even if we assume that the knowledge pro duced by social research has potentially equal rele vance to all segments of the population (despite their unequal opportunities to define the problems for research), the disadvantaged groups have less ready access to that knowledge. They are less likely to have the financial and technical resources and the trained personnel that are needed to make use of the findings. Moreover, insofar as the re search has not been informed by their perspectives, the findings are less likely to be in a form in which they readily can apply them to their purposes.
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These structural inequalities have not been as detrimental to the disadvantaged groups as they might have been because, as I have argued, the sponsors and practitioners of social research have not been monolithically oriented to the interests of the establishment, and because the perspectives and interests of the disadvantaged groups have at least indirectly informed the production and utilization of research data. On the other hand, the prob ability that social research will work to the dis advantage of the powerless may well increase as the potential usefulness of social research becomes more apparent to these in power, unless we de velop more effective mechanisms of correcting for the current power imbalance. Let me turn then, briefly, to an examination of some corrective approaches.
Some Corrective Approaches
There are occasions when a piece of social re, search may damage-so clearly the interests of the groups studied and violate their rights that it ought to be stopped. We do need to develop and extend mechanisms that will protect subjects against such abuses, without imposing political controls on the freedom of research. There are also occasions when an investigator may decide to refrain volun tarily from a particular line of research because he feels the probability that its products will he put to negative uses is too high. Such assessments must be left to the individual investigator. The most important corrective approaches, however, are not those designed to stop a particular line of re search, but those designed to balance it-to make sure that all segments of the population have an opportunity to bring their perspectives to bear on the Iormulatlon of the problems, and to safeguard their interests in the interpretation and utilization of the results. At the level or the individual project, this means institutionalizing ways of involving representatives of the group under study both in the conduct of the research and in the utilization of the findings. At the level of research policy and the organization of research within the society, it means institutionalizing ways of diversifying the community of producers and users of social re search. Such diversification would counteract the power imbalance by focusing on the research that is done rather than on the research that is prevented.
I examine here some 01 the institutionalized ways of correcting the current power imbalance in terms of mechanisms of accountability, patterns of research sponsorship, patterns of research par ticipation, and patterns of researcb utilizatio~.
Mechanisms oj accountability. Counterinsur gency research and its possible extensions to the domestic American scene underline the need for mechanisms to protect the groups under study against possible abuses. Mechanisms that might serve this purpose are basically similar to the mechanisms or protection and accountability that I discussed in connection with the processes of social research, since the ethical issues involved are directly continuous with the issues of deception, invasion or privacy, and deprivation of consent dis cussed in the earlier section. That is, serious ethical problems may arise because the investigator represents himself as an independent researcher when in fact his research is linked, directly or in directly, to the mission of counterinsurgency agen cies; or because the investigator violates the con fidentiality of data by turning over information to such agencies; or because the investigator exposes the group he studies to possible harm or manipula tion withonl informing them of these risks. How; ever, the professional associations have found it even more difficult to deal with these problems than with the ethical problems arising in the usual in vestlgator-snbject relationship. The issues are more complicated than those involved in the one to-one relationship of investigator and subject be cause they are intertwined closely with the sponsor ship and political purposes of the research, and because they usually involve the possibility of harm to a group (such as an ethnic minority or a political faction) rather than to an identifiable individual.
Indeed, the imposition of controls and sanctions in this domain represents some very real dangers to the freedom of research from political constraints, since the line between ethical and political objec tions to a piece of research is often very hard to draw. Nevertheless, the line must be drawn. Vio lations of the rights of groups to voluntary in formed consent and to the protection of their pri vacy, their confidences, and their interests cannot be countenanced on the basis of the investigator's legitimate right to freedom of research. Existing review committees and ethics committees must ex tend their functions-c-or special mechanisms of protection and accountability must be set up-to handle these types of violations. The challenge is to develop criteria and procedures that will make it possible to delegitlmize research activities that are based on the systematic violation of the rights of subjects, without legitimizing the imposition of political controls on research. In general, I would follow the principle of reserving external controls and sanctions to those cases that involve fairly obvious abuses, while leaving it to other meeha nisms to correct for the more subtle and remote disadvantages that social research may bring to powerless groups.
Patterns oj research sponsorship. A necessary condition Ior achieving greater balance in the products of social research is to retain and ill fact enhance the ability of social science to bring inde pendent and diverse perspectives to bear on the study of social institutions and societal processes. In developing a national research policy, therefore, it is essential to work out patterns of research spon sorship and funding that are consistent with this principle. The sponsorship of social research, or of any area within it, must be diversified as much as possible; it should not be entirely in the hands 01 either governmental or private agencies and, within the governmental framework, no area of rc search should be monopolized by a single agency or set of agencies. Such monopolies are particularly dangerous when they are held by a mission-oriented agency-for example, the military, which has had a virtual monopoly in supporting certain areas of scientific work in the United States. Similarly, there is a need for diversity in the recipients of research funds. If research is carried cut in dif ferent types of organizational settings, located in different areas, and staffed by investigators with different backgrounds, then the range of perspec tives is likely to be broadened. It would be useful, for example, to carry out some research outside of a university coruext-c-perbaps by a community agency-in order to balance out the special bias that the university scholar usually brings to a problem.
Special care must be taken to preserve the autonomy of the organizations in which social re, search is carried out-particularly the universities, which are designed to serve as a major source of independent perspectives in the society. Sponsor ing agencies, as well as the universities themselves, have the responsibility of avoiding the types o[ con-tracts that will undermine their autonomy. Secret research provides the most obvious example here; many kinds of operational research may also be inappropriate for the university setting. This is another reason for experimenting with a 'variety of organizational settings for research. Certain kinds of research-such as research that is designed specifically to facilitate or evaluate the functioning of an operational agency-probably can be carried out more effectively in an in-house research facility or in an independent (ncnuniversity) re~earch or ganization. When carried out within the univer sity, on the other hand, such research well may weaken the university's unique capacity as an autonomous agency. A good way of testing the autonomy of a given research project is to examine systematically the assumptions that underlie iI-if possible, with the help of colleagues who approach the problem from different cultural perspectives. In a truly independent piece of research, tnere should be no assumption that the investigator Ieels bound to leave unquestioned.
Patterns of research participatioll. Perhaps the most important way of counteracting current im balances is to extend the range of participants in the conduct of social researcb At the level of the individual research project, this goal can be accom plished partly by the development of participatory research patterns, as described earlier. In an action research program, for example, the subjects play an active role in the Iormnletlon and conduct of the research and the research is addressed to the problems with which their community is concerned. Even when the opportunities for active participa tion of the subjects are limited, it is often possible to extend the range 01 investigators who participate in the research. Whenever an investigator carries out research in a culture or subculture different from his own, it is particularly important to involve social scientists who are members of the community under study as colleagues in the planning, conduct, and analysis of the research. Such involvement is important, not only for ethical reasons (i.e., be cause it helps to protect the interests 01 the group under study), but also for scientific reasons (t.e., because it helps to balance the investigator's per spective as an outsider with those of colleagues who qualify as insiders).
At the level 01 research policy and the organiza lion of research, the need is lo broaden the base of participation in the research process, nationally • as well as internationally. I like to speak in this connection of the democratization of Ole reseorctc cemnucuity, The capacities and opportunities to carry out social research must be made available to all segments 01 the population. By the same token, all segments should participate equally in the role 01 subject; the pattern must be one of reciprocal exposure rather than of a sharp division between those who do the research and those who are researched upon.
There are some inherent limitations ill the extent to which the disadvantaged segments of the pccula ticn can be represented genuinely in the research process. Members of these groups who receive training a~ social scientists are, by definition, no longer "typical" of the groups they represent. Be cause of their high level of education arul the financial and cultural conditions associated with it, their interests and perspectives are likely to diverge in at least some impor-tant ways Itorn tbose of the most disadvantaged segments of the society. Never theless, the hase of social research would be broad ened ronsideeahly if more of its participants were recruited from the segments of the society that are now underrepresented. It would bring into the field individuals whe-e-though not quite typical of the disadvantaged groups--would have a greater identification with their problems and a greater awareness of [heir perspectives
In speaking of representativeness, I do not mean to imply that social research ought to be trans formed inlo a political process, in which scientific truth is determined by who prevails in a power struggle. This view sometimes is conveyed by self-appointed spokesmen for disadvantaged groups, who try to use their power to exclude outsiders from research in minority communities or to deter mine the conclusions that can be drawn Irorn such research. In evaluating this kind of tactic, we must keep in mind that there is considerable ambiguity about whom such spokesmen represent; they do bring their own special interests to the situation, and there is at leastthe possibility thai they merely are replacing one lorm 01 oppression 01 the power less with another. Though these tactics may be based on a genuine concern with the power im balance that has characterized so much of social research, I see them as a distortion 01 the process of democratizing the research community, which can only have the effect of undermining the in tegrity of the research enterprise. lOJ4 • NOVEMBER 1972 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST -\ Democratization, as I see it, would enhance rather than endanger the integrity of social re search. It aims for representativeness in the sense that the perspectives of tbe disadvantaged groups would be brought to hear more fully and Iairly on the research process. Broadening the base of par ticipation in social research would allow the inter ests and frames of reference of the disadvantaged groups a larger role in the formulation of the ques tions to which the research addresses itself and in the interpretation of the research findings.
By bringing a variety of perspectives to bear on re search problems, democratization would not only reduce the likelihood that the products of the re search would give advantages Lo some groups at the expense of others, but it would also increase the overall validity of these products.
Pat/ems oj research utilization, To counteract the current power imbalance, it is essential to ex tend not only the range of those who participate in social research but also the range of those who are able to utilize its findings. At the level of the individual research project, we must develop and institutionalize mechanisms of providing the indi viduals, groups, and communities that serve as sub. jects some meaningful access to the data they con. tributed. Findings that mighl be potentially use ful to them, or that conceivably might be used against their interests, should be commtlnicated to them in language they can understand. The (ltlr pose of such communication would be to indicate concrete ways of utilizing the findings to their own advantage and of protecting themselves against the possibly damaging uses to which others might put these findings. Furthermore, community or ganizations trusted by the subjects can be given access to the findings (which in most cases would not mean the raw data), so that they can take steps to utilize them in the community's interest and to protect the community against potentially harmful consequences.
At the level of research policy and the organiza tion of research, there is a need for wider distribu tion among all segments of the population of the skills and resources needed to utilize the data of social research. Organizations representing the in terests of the disadvantaged segments of the popu lation must acquire the capabilities for using re search findings in the development of their own programs and in their inputs to the debates around local and national policies. A major component of the requisite skills and resources is the capacity to counteract incomplete or faulty interpretations and applications of research data that might be detri, mental LO the interests of their group.
In the final analysis, the democratization of the community of research producers and research users must be seen as part of the process of re distributing power within our society at large. Social (and other) scientists, however, can con trihute to this larger process by correcting the im balances within their own spheres.
